In his regular YouTube address, Arthur Hambardzoumyan raises issues that are either deliberately avoided in Armenia’s public discourse or pushed to the margins of public attention. In his assessment, over the past few years, the Armenian people have gradually become accustomed to developments that would have been considered unacceptable not long ago.
The tragedy of October 27, 1999, was not merely a bloody act of violence; it became a catalyst for broader political and strategic changes. Before these events, Robert Kocharyan’s policy in the negotiation process was under clear pressure and control from Vazgen Sargsyan. After Sargsyan’s assassination, Kocharyan gained greater freedom of action, which suggests that his earlier steps had been constrained by external influence.
Robert Kocharyan’s rise to power in 1998 was the outcome of a multi-step political combination unfolding between 1996 and 1998. Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation, which at first glance appeared to stem from disagreements over the Karabakh settlement, became a turning point: after victory in the First Karabakh War, society was not prepared to accept capitulation.
According to experts from the Public Tribunal, the processes under review point to a structural crisis in the interaction between the state, the Church, and society. In its current form, Nikol Pashinyan’s policy contributes to deeper societal division, a reduction of institutional autonomy, and the weakening of mechanisms of national consolidation.
In light of the recent allegations and evident slander disseminated against the military and political leadership of Artsakh, the video address by lawyer Roman Yeritsyan has acquired particular significance. His address was an attempt to restore an accurate picture of events and to counter the truth to the organized information campaign.
Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s readiness for concessions in 1997–1998 was neither an impulsive mistake nor the result of short-term pressure. It fit squarely within a stable conceptual model that was widely circulated in Western diplomatic and analytical circles at the time and clearly articulated through what became known as the “Goble Plan.”
The summer of 1997 became not only a moment of external pressure, but also a moment of internal ideological rupture, for which Levon Ter-Petrosyan bore personal responsibility. His article “War or Peace: The Moment of Seriousness” was presented as an act of sober realism. In reality, however, it amounted to an ideological formulation of a defeatist logic that was inherently unfavorable to Armenia. Instead of challenging the externally imposed “chess game,” the president effectively accepted the role of a lesser piece, justifying strategic concessions by fatigue from war, rather than by the necessity to continue the struggle.
The “Public Tribunal” project presents to its readers the work of Ara Harutyunyan, “The Political Situation of the Armenian People, Its Theory, What Must Be Done and What Must Not Be Done.”
In an interview with the local Fifth Channel, former Prime Minister of Armenia Hrant Bagratyan commented on a statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas regarding the need to counter “foreign malign interference” ahead of the 2026 elections. According to Bagratyan, such wording allows for broad interpretations of domestic political processes and the assessment of their outcomes.
If, in 2026, Armenia transitions to a new model of governance, it could seize the opportunities currently slipping through its grasp: strengthening its regional position, rebuilding alliances, modernizing the state, and leveraging its geopolitical vulnerabilities to trim between power centers.
