ALL ARE EQUAL BEFORE THE LAW, EXCEPT PASHINYAN
One of the most striking slogans of the “Velvet Revolution” was that there would be no untouchables in Armenia. Everyone would be equal before the law. State institutions would stop serving the interests of those in power, and elections would become a fair competition of political programs.
Eight years have passed.
Today, it is hard to shake the feeling that the only person these promises never applied to is Nikol Pashinyan himself.
Article 23 of Armenia’s Electoral Code is titled “Prohibition of the Use of Administrative Resources and Restrictions on Pre-Election Campaigning.” It prohibits candidates who are public officials from using their positions to gain an advantage in elections, including the use of state information, financial, human, and administrative resources for campaign purposes.
Such requirements seem self-evident.
However, during the 2026 parliamentary elections, it became apparent that there are two Armenias. In one, there are participants in the electoral process for whom the law is mandatory. In the other, there is Nikol Pashinyan — the prime minister, the leader of the ruling party, the central figure on the state information agenda, and the principal beneficiary of all the advantages provided by administrative resources.
There is no need to prove whether state resources were used in the interests of the ruling party. In such a system, it could hardly be otherwise. The state apparatus, official information platforms, public television, the powers associated with the office of the prime minister, and his political status were effectively integrated into the election campaign of the Civil Contract Party.
The government continued to operate in its usual mode throughout the campaign. The prime minister’s office functioned as usual. The same was true of state information resources and public television.
Administrative interference is not limited to officials, government vehicles, and the state bureaucracy. It also includes an information machine financed by all taxpayers but serving only one political force.
Particular attention should be paid to the Public Television of Armenia CJSC. Despite its name, during the election campaign, it became increasingly less public. It increasingly resembled the television channel of the Civil Contract Party.
On May 3, 2026, its evening news broadcast reported that the only opposition candidate for prime minister was allegedly Robert Kocharyan. The Strong Armenia Party called the information false and filed a lawsuit against the broadcaster for defamation. As expected, the judicial system once again sided with the interests of the Civil Contract Party.
One might assume this was an isolated mistake, one of many surprising coincidences on public television during the campaign. Yet all such mistakes, inaccuracies, and political interpretations consistently worked against the opposition and never against the authorities.
A glance at political talk shows on public television is enough to understand that it is no longer a public platform for debate. It increasingly resembles a political headquarters operating from a television studio.
The political programs hosted by Petros Ghazaryan provide perhaps the clearest evidence of this. Even an inexperienced viewer can easily recognize the line separating journalism from service to the authorities. Judging by numerous episodes, that line was crossed long before the election campaign began.
All of this created political advantages for one party and one individual on a daily basis.
The conduct of the law-enforcement system is no less illustrative. Although Article 23 of the Electoral Code prohibits the use of public office to gain electoral advantages, it is difficult to imagine a more blatant form of administrative interference than a situation in which one political force campaigns with the support of the entire state machinery while its opponents are forced to defend themselves against criminal prosecutions, arrests, and pressure from security agencies.
Throughout the campaign, society witnessed the same pattern repeatedly. Following Nikol Pashinyan’s often hysterical attacks on political opponents, those same opponents became targets of law-enforcement bodies. The impression grew that the state apparatus was becoming ever more actively involved in the political struggle on the side of the incumbent authorities. A vivid example was the arrest of Andranik Tevanyan following Nikol Pashinyan’s public threats.
The Hayaqve Civil Initiative called on Armenia’s Central Electoral Commission (CEC) to revoke Nikol Pashinyan’s candidacy on the proportional list of the Civil Contract Party in the June parliamentary elections, for abuse of office and incitement to violence.
According to a statement posted by Hayaqve on Facebook, at the final stage of the campaign, the ruling regime — foreseeing an inevitable defeat — resorted not only to open calls for violence against its political opponents but also to openly unlawful and severe repression. In particular, Hayaqve noted that on May 20, Prime Minister Pashinyan, while officially on leave and possessing no formal authority, directly instructed the National Security Service to initiate criminal proceedings against Andranik Tevanyan, leader of the Mother Armenia Party and the second candidate on the Prosperous Armenia Party list.
Did the CEC respond to Hayaqve’s appeal? Of course not.
This is no longer merely a political issue; it is a constitutional and legal one.
Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia reaffirms that power belongs to the people and is exercised through free elections. Moreover, the Constitution explicitly states that usurpation of power by an individual or organization constitutes a crime.
Consequently, if power is obtained or retained through violations of the principle of free elections, through the use of administrative resources, state institutions, and high-ranking offices, this constitutes a violation not only of the Electoral Code but also of the Constitution.
It should also be noted that Armenia’s Criminal Code treats violations of the foundations of the constitutional order as among the gravest crimes against the state. The overthrow of the constitutional order carries a prison sentence of 10 to 15 years.
Did Prosecutor General Anna Vardapetyan react in any way to these violations? Were there any statements, instructions, inspections, or demands for a legal assessment of the facts? Did the Prosecutor’s Office, so sensitive to statements made by opposition figures, show any interest whatsoever in the actions of the ruling authorities?
Of course, not.
As in many other cases, the Prosecutor’s Office remains silent when potential violations involve Nikol Pashinyan or his political team.
The “Velvet Revolutionaries” often speak about the triumph of democracy. Yet democracy does not begin with victory speeches or election figures published by the CEC. It begins with recognition of a simple truth: the law must apply equally to everyone. Yet there remains a category of people permitted to do what is forbidden to others.
Judging by the 2026 campaign, Nikol Pashinyan belongs to that category.
Thus, the dispute surrounding the 2026 elections is not about percentages, mandates, or political preferences. It is about the constitutional principle of democracy versus the rule of force.
If equality before the law does not exist, the logic underlying the democratic formation of legislative power collapses.
In that case, elections are no longer decided by institutions but by the ability to defend political rights in the streets, where administrative pressure from the authorities is countered only by pressure from the other side.
Whether the opposition is capable of defending its victory under such inherently unequal conditions is the main and perhaps the only truly meaningful test it faces.
