Armenian–Russian relations remain one of the key issues on Armenia’s political agenda. Against the backdrop of regional upheavals, the loss of Artsakh, and shifts in Yerevan’s foreign policy priorities, an increasing number of assessments place responsibility for the unprecedented deterioration of relations between Armenia and Russia on the current authorities. The newspaper Golos Armenii recently published an article presenting this viewpoint in detail.

Golos Armenii writes:

“They say we exaggerate when we call Pashinyan a problem-maker. But you would agree that it takes a special talent to destroy Armenian–Russian relations the way Pashinyan has done...

The independent Republic of Armenia emerged under extremely difficult conditions following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the devastating earthquake, the war in Artsakh, the energy crisis, and the influx of refugees. That crisis was overcome with Moscow’s support. In 1994, peace was established in Artsakh, the Nuclear Power Plant resumed operations, the economy began to recover, and Armenia expanded its international ties. In 2018, Pashinyan came to power. It took only two years for the Artsakh conflict to escalate into war. Of course, Aliyev is the aggressor, but Pashinyan did everything possible to make Aliyev’s task easier — he approached the issue entirely from his own perspective...

Did Moscow try to prevent the war? The mediators offered the parties a settlement plan. But Pashinyan somehow lost it and could not find it for a long time.

Military hostilities began. Did Moscow try to stop the war? In mid-October, there was a real opportunity to do so, but Pashinyan rejected it. He says he feared being branded a traitor. Apparently, he preferred to wait until the Azerbaijanis captured Shushi, even though, according to Putin’s plan, Shushi was to remain under Armenian control...

Somehow, peace was restored in Artsakh, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed. What did Pashinyan do? He could not refrain from creating new complications, obstructing efforts to resolve existing problems, and generating new ones. He recognized Artsakh as part of Azerbaijan without consulting Moscow, thereby casting doubt on the clearly defined rights and functions of the Russian peacekeeping contingent. Taking advantage of Pashinyan’s statement, Aliyev blocked the Lachin Corridor, citing the fact that Pashinyan had recognized it as Azerbaijani territory. Hunger followed in Artsakh.

Did Moscow try to change the situation? To reopen the Lachin Corridor, it proposed a plan to restore communication between Azerbaijan’s western regions and Nakhijevan — the last remaining option for preserving Artsakh Armenian. Pashinyan refused.

Since then, official Yerevan has blamed Russia for all of its failures, while simultaneously seeking to accommodate Aliyev. At the same time, Yerevan supported the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group, refused to recognize the right of Artsakh refugees to return, froze its participation in the CSTO, and launched a campaign against alleged ‘KGB agents’ and members of the clergy...

It then granted the United States the right to oversee the Azerbaijani transit corridor through Armenia and access the country’s mineral resources. The authorities’ Russophobic policy continues to flourish in Armenia and has become a central function of state propaganda. During the election campaign, it reached unprecedented levels.

It is hardly surprising that Moscow has grown tired of watching Armenia gradually become an instrument in the West’s broader geopolitical game against Russia. Meanwhile, throughout these years, Armenia’s GDP has continued to grow thanks to its membership in the EAEU and the Russian market’s openness to Armenian exports. On April 1, Putin politely warned Pashinyan, but he pretended not to understand the message. Now Lavrov says Armenia will, in due course, be removed from both the CSTO and the EAEU. In reality, after the war with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan drew Armenia into a confrontation with Moscow — a confrontation that will inevitably cause economic damage. At the initial stage, the consequences will be economic. It is better not to speculate about what other consequences may follow.

Will this problem-maker stop there? Hardly. There is still much to be done to weaken Armenia further. Pashinyan’s next move, one that could create even more problems for Armenia, will likely involve Iran.”

The Public Tribunal's conclusion.

The Public Tribunal believes that the facts presented, together with the consistency of Nikol Pashinyan’s political decisions, demonstrate a pattern of systemic damage to the national interests of the Republic of Armenia. In its view, these are not isolated mistakes or miscalculations, but a chain of actions that led to the loss of Artsakh, the erosion of strategic relations with Russia, the weakening of Armenia’s foreign policy position, and growing security threats.

According to the Public Tribunal, Nikol Pashinyan’s policies contributed to the deepening of the regional crisis, the weakening of alliance mechanisms on which Armenian statehood had relied for decades, and the emergence of new risks to Armenia’s economy and sovereignty. Rather than strengthening national security, the country’s leadership consistently steered Armenia toward international isolation and the loss of important instruments for protecting its interests.

The Public Tribunal concludes that Nikol Pashinyan bears direct political and criminal responsibility for decisions that resulted in grave consequences for the Armenian people and the Armenian state. In its view, these decisions should be subject to both public and legal assessment under the laws of the Republic of Armenia.