NOT ABOUT MANDATES, BUT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION’S RIGHT TO EXIST
Debates over whether the opposition should accept parliamentary mandates or refuse them are intensifying. Yet, it appears that the issue is not really about mandates at all.
Mandates are merely one episode in an evolving political process. What matters far more is understanding what role the opposition will be allowed to play within that process.
JUDGING BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, THE ISSUE IS NOT THE OPPOSITION’S PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL LIFE, BUT ITS GRADUAL REMOVAL FROM IT
At first glance, such a claim may seem exaggerated. However, the facts point in that direction.
On the one hand, the opposition is being urged to take up its mandates. On the other, a campaign is emerging that seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the forces that received the support of a significant share of protest voters.
In this regard, the position of Arman Babajanyan, leader of the For the Republic Party, is particularly illustrative, as he is clearly acting in support of Nikol Pashinyan. Formally, the issue concerns challenging the election results before the Constitutional Court. Yet the substance of these statements goes much further. The focus is not only on individual violations, but on the entire political and social environment in which the elections were held.
This raises a legitimate question: if the problem lies not only in the vote count but in the entire system that produced the result, what conclusions could such reasoning ultimately lead to?
The answer is obvious: it would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the current parliament as a whole.
This, in turn, raises another question: who is dissatisfied with the current composition of the National Assembly?
More specifically, whose long-term political objectives are obstructed by the existence of a strong opposition?
And this concerns not only the urrent authorities.
The existing parliament objectively complicates the adoption of decisions related to constitutional amendments, Armenian-Turkish normalization, the fulfillment of Azerbaijan’s demands, territorial concessions, and the region’s ongoing geopolitical transformation. Under such circumstances, Robert Kocharyan’s Armenia Alliance and Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia become more than parliamentary factions — they become political factors that some may seek to neutralize.
In this context, particular attention should be paid to Nikol Pashinyan’s recent statements.
Speaking in the National Assembly on June 16, the prime minister called for the creation of safeguards to eliminate the political influence of forces that allegedly bribed voters.
Moreover, Pashinyan openly stated that the current parliamentary opposition emerged as a result of “completely illegal activity” and that the state has the right to deprive the relevant circles of the opportunity to engage in political activity.
Such statements can hardly be dismissed as ordinary political polemics.
In essence, they amount to a political doctrine.
There is a growing impression that society is being prepared for a broader scenario. First, it will be argued that the current parliament does not accurately reflect the country's real political sentiments. Next, the opposition will be portrayed as a product of illegal activity. It will then be linked to criminal and oligarchic networks, as well as to external influence. This will pave the way for calls to reform the opposition landscape and, consequently, for demands for snap elections. New legislative restrictions may follow, allowing authorities to determine which political forces are eligible to compete for parliamentary representation.
After that, new elections can be held.
But without the current opposition.
If this logic appears far-fetched, it is enough to recall recent experience.
Consider what happened to Gagik Tsarukyan’s Prosperous Armenia Party. In broad daylight and before the eyes of society, the Central Electoral Commission invalidated the results of two polling stations. As a result, the party lost precisely the number of votes it needed to cross the parliamentary threshold.
Opinions may differ regarding the legal merits of that decision. The political outcome, however, is clear: a significant number of voters were left without representation in parliament.
This raises an obvious question: if one mechanism has already been used to prevent an opposition force from entering parliament, why could other mechanisms not be used against those opposition forces that remain?
Especially since signs of preparation for a new political cycle are becoming increasingly visible.
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE OPPOSITION CAMP ARE NO LESS INTERESTING
It is difficult not to notice that some politicians are taking positions that cannot be explained solely by the current political environment.
One example is Edmon Marukyan’s recent and openly anti-Serzh line.
Viewed in the context of possible snap elections and a future redistribution of voters, much becomes easier to understand.
It cannot be ruled out that a new political project is being developed to attract part of the opposition electorate — primarily voters who support Robert Kocharyan while simultaneously holding negative views of Serzh Sargsyan.
From this perspective, the public exchanges between Edmon Marukyan and Eduard Sharmazanov take on a different meaning. The public sees a clash between irreconcilable opponents and is encouraged to believe that deep contradictions separate them.
What distinguishes politics from theater, however, is the existence of processes hidden behind the stage set.
At the same time, other developments within the opposition camp deserve close attention.
Alongside the conflict between the authorities and the opposition, there is also a struggle between competing strategies within the opposition itself.
Так, обращает на себя внимание позиция ряда представителей команды Самвела Карапетяна. В частности, Гоар Мелоян и Эдгар Казарян, которые аффилированы с третьим президентом Сержем Саргсяном, в своих публичных выступлениях последовательно продвигают тезис о необходимости принятия мандатов и одновременно подчеркивают отсутствие в обществе потенциала для масштабного уличного сопротивления.
Such an approach may be regarded as one possible political tactic. However, in the context of ongoing developments, it inevitably raises questions.
If the authorities are indeed seeking to delegitimize and remove the main opposition forces from the political arena, then a strategy that confines the struggle to parliamentary activity appears, at the very least, open to debate. This is especially true given that the authorities are openly questioning the opposition’s right to continue its political existence.
This leads to a question that may not be avoidable for much longer.
Did Samvel Karapetyan deliberately surround himself with politicians whose strategic outlook is aligned with Serzh Sargsyan’s approach? Or is Strong Armenia gradually becoming hostage to the third president’s political game? A potential restructuring of the opposition landscape could create opportunities for Sargsyan’s return to active politics.
Of course, there is no definitive answer to this question today. Yet the very fact that such a question is being asked is revealing — especially when the future of the opposition depends not on parliamentary mandates, but on its ability to accurately assess the nature and scale of the challenges it faces.
THEREFORE, THE KEY QUESTION TODAY IS NOT WHETHER THE OPPOSITION WILL ACCEPT ITS MANDATES
The key question is whether it fully understands the threats confronting it.
If the current scenario truly aims at removing the Armenia Alliance, Strong Armenia, and other independent opposition centers from the political landscape, then there is little time left for illusions.
In that case, parliament alone will not be able to resolve the issue.
The debate is no longer about the distribution of mandates. It is about the opposition’s right to exist.
The circumstances leave no room for half measures. Under such conditions, only one path remains: decisive and consistent action. Otherwise, the question of the opposition’s political future will be settled without its participation.
