Serzh Sargsyan As a Political Dismantler: 2021-2026
Elections 2021: Opinion of the Former Head of the Armenian National Security Service
Armenia entered the 2021 parliamentary elections in a state that can more accurately be described as collective trauma than as a political crisis. This assessment, made by the former head of the National Security Service (NSS) of Armenia, Lt. General Karlos Petrosyan, offers a retrospective diagnosis of the period.
The country went into elections still reeling from the aftermath of war, with thousands of casualties and a security system in disarray. Under normal circumstances, this would have sparked serious discussions on accountability. However, in Armenia in 2021, what unfolded was a political performance where the leading figure was Serzh Sargsyan, despite all his declarations to the contrary.
Sargsyan's return to politics, despite a 95% disapproval rating, was not a political misstep; it was a calculated move that ultimately ensured the preservation of power for Nikol Pashinyan. Sargsyan's reappearance served as a living reminder of the past, from which the Armenian people were desperate to escape — even if it meant aligning with the political force responsible for losing the war.
Lt. General Petrosyan paid special attention to the so-called "compromising materials" that emerged during this period, which he argued contained nothing truly revelatory. The audio recordings released by Serzh Sargsyan, supposedly aimed at damaging Pashinyan's reputation, were, in Petrosyan's view, a farce rather than a political bombshell. According to him, in real politics, important materials are neither "saved for later" nor presented as half-sensational leaks. Such materials, he argued, either do not exist or are deployed in a different manner. His conclusion: the publicized attacks on Pashinyan were never meant to destroy him.
Petrosyan also highlighted the paradoxical effect of Sargsyan’s actions: rather than weakening Pashinyan, they objectively worked in his favor. A political figure with a monumental anti-popularity rating entering the political arena acted as a peculiar shield for Pashinyan, Petrosyan believed. The 2021 elections, in his view, were not about supporting the incumbent government; they were about a widespread fear of the return of the former regime. Petrosyan pointed out that had Sargsyan actually possessed material that could destroy Pashinyan politically, he would have used it differently and much earlier.
At this point, Petrosyan argued, Serzh Sargsyan’s statements about resisting the government could no longer be considered credible.
Who Brought Pashinyan to Power
A reminder to readers: in 2018, Armenia witnessed a change of power. The primary figure responsible for Nikol Pashinyan’s rise to power was Serzh Sargsyan — the former president and long-time leader of the Republican Party. It was under Sargsyan’s leadership and with his tacit, yet effectively direct, complicity that the so-called “people’s revolution” was orchestrated, masking a carefully managed change of power.
The process began with the blatant violation of previously made promises. In 2014, Sargsyan initiated constitutional reforms with the explicit pledge not to run for prime minister under the new parliamentary system. Yet, he ultimately nominated himself for the position, intentionally provoking mass public discontent. This decision acted as the catalyst for what was, in essence, a premeditated scenario of street pressure.
As Nikol Pashinyan’s group engaged in increasingly illegal actions, the state institutions controlled by Sargsyan effectively collapsed. Law enforcement and security agencies failed in their constitutional duty to maintain order, not only permitting unlawful protests, the blocking of strategic infrastructure, and government pressure, but also implicitly encouraging these actions through inaction.
These developments were further legitimized by the then-president, Armen Sargsyan, who was appointed under Serzh Sargsyan, despite lacking the requisite qualifications. His formal presence helped to simulate the legality of the ongoing power seizure and allowed its institutionalization.
The managed transfer of power became fully visible in the composition of Nikol Pashinyan’s first government. Key positions in national security, finance, economics, foreign policy, and electoral oversight were filled by individuals with direct ties to the former regime. This clearly demonstrated that, despite being formally “overthrown,” Serzh Sargsyan retained significant influence over the strategic direction of state governance.
This orchestrated shift in power led to disastrous consequences. Once in office, Pashinyan announced a “reset” of negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh, starting from scratch. This move undermined the previous negotiation framework and set in motion a series of events that culminated in the 44-day war of 2020. The political responsibility for this chain of events dates back far earlier than 2018, beginning at the moment when Serzh Sargsyan consciously paved the way for the destructive scenario that followed.
Post-War Retention of Power with the Help of Sargsyan
After the catastrophe of 2020, Armenia was presented with a rare opportunity for a political reset. That opportunity was deliberately squandered, and Serzh Sargsyan played a central role in this outcome.
Rather than stepping aside, accepting responsibility for years of governance, and exiting the political arena, Sargsyan returned. His re-entry fractured the opposition, effectively blending his own high disapproval rating with that of Robert Kocharyan and thereby depriving the latter of a realistic chance of victory.
This was not a struggle for power; it was a struggle against the emergence of an alternative.
As Karlos Petrosyan stated openly, Serzh Sargsyan’s primary objective was not to remove Nikol Pashinyan from office, but to prevent Robert Kocharyan from winning. In 2021, that objective was achieved.
How Serzh Sargsyan Boycotted the Change of Power under the Guise of Fighting It
By early 2025, Armenia’s domestic political situation had entered a phase of open turbulence. On the surface, this appeared as an escalating confrontation between the two main opposition camps. In reality, it reflected a much deeper crisis — one of confidence, political accountability, and the perception of political agency. Once again, the central figure in this phase was Armenia’s third president, Serzh Sargsyan, whose political activity intensified in 2025 not spontaneously, but in a calculated and systemic manner.
Formally, the opposition proclaimed a single objective: the removal of Nikol Pashinyan. However, as early as the beginning of the year, it became evident that Serzh Sargsyan’s underlying logic diverged from the logic of the 2026 electoral contest. Confronted with a record-high disapproval rating and a clear understanding that he had no chance of winning elections, he opted for an alternative mechanism — an extra-electoral transfer of power through impeachment, framed in the rhetoric of “constitutional procedure” and “legitimacy.”
From the outset, the impeachment initiative promoted in 2025 appeared paradoxical. Parliament lacked the necessary votes, street pressure was fragmented, and society remained demoralized. Nevertheless, Serzh Sargsyan’s camp persistently advanced the idea through affiliated media outlets, bloggers, and so-called “civil activists,” thereby cultivating the illusion of the prime minister’s inevitable resignation.
Notably, the impeachment campaign was frequently directed not at Nikol Pashinyan, but at the second opposition pole — Robert Kocharyan’s team. Kocharyan was accused of “sabotage,” “playing into the hands of the regime,” and even maintaining an informal alliance with the incumbent prime minister. In this way, impeachment rhetoric became a tool for discrediting Kocharyan’s opposition force rather than a genuine mechanism for changing power.
The rift within the opposition became explicit following Robert Kocharyan’s press conference in February 2025, during which he openly acknowledged the absence of any synergy with Serzh Sargsyan’s camp and described an alliance with it as irrational. This position triggered a large-scale information offensive by Sargsyan’s supporters.
Media figures affiliated with the Republican Party launched a campaign portraying Kocharyan as the principal obstacle to the “salvation of the country.” At the same time, Serzh Sargsyan himself remained in the background, allowing allied voices to shape the narrative. This tactic — avoiding direct confrontation while retaining strategic control over the process — is characteristic of his political style.
Hypocrisy of the Architect of Defeat
Against the backdrop of the destructive consequences of his political decisions — decisions that led Armenia to a strategic defeat and enabled both the rise and continued reproduction of Nikol Pashinyan’s power — the recent statements by Serzh Sargsyan regarding the “difficulties of uniting the opposition” sound like open political hypocrisy. The very individual who paved the way for the incumbent regime’s institutional stability now speaks of opposition weakness, while entirely disregarding his own central role in the current political reality.
It is noteworthy that these remarks were made on February 3, 2026, in front of the Anti-Corruption Court building. Speaking to journalists, Armenia’s third president stated:
“I have a desire to unite, but developments show that opposition unity is a difficult task. I am not speaking about running on a single ballot; let us wait and see.”
Words of this nature, when uttered by a figure who transformed the country’s defeat into a managed political process — and who continues to bear direct responsibility for it — sound less like an objective assessment and more like a cynical attempt to evade accountability for his own choices.
