Illusion of Security: What the Foreign Intelligence Service of Armenia Is Really Concealing
The 2026 report of Armenia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) is not an analysis of the foreign policy environment. Rather, it reflects the systematic dismantling of the national security system carried out by the current authorities.
Behind expert-sounding rhetoric lies a document that, instead of warning of imminent threats, seeks to justify decisions already taken and to simulate the rationality of a course whose long-term consequences will be painful for Armenia.
Instead of fulfilling its early-warning function, the report serves as a form of anesthesia for society. It avoids calling the sources of the problems by their proper names and refuses to acknowledge obvious facts: a significant portion of the identified threats is the direct result of steps taken by Nikol Pashinyan’s government. Accountability is methodically removed from the text, while risks are presented as external, almost natural phenomena, unrelated to failures in domestic governance.
The document’s key position — maintaining Armenia’s frozen status within the CSTO — is presented as a neutral fact requiring no discussion. In reality, this approach deliberately dismantles the only functioning mechanism of collective defense at a time when military threats have not disappeared but merely changed form. The report avoids addressing the fundamental question of state security: who will assume the obligation to defend the country in the event of the use of force? There is no answer, because there is no replacement for the system that has been pushed aside.
In the text, criticism of the CSTO substitutes for genuine analysis. The report offers neither an alternative security architecture nor any new alliances or guarantees from other states. Armenia is effectively left on its own, yet this is portrayed as a conscious and allegedly advantageous choice. In reality, this represents the deliberate acceptance of strategic risk placed above the basic interests of the state. This is no longer a miscalculation, but a political decision with predictably dangerous consequences.
The section of the report devoted to “hybrid threats” is of particular significance. It is extensive, detailed, and deeply ambiguous. The report speaks in the language of insinuation, addressed primarily to external centers of influence. It is not an intelligence assessment, but a camouflaged message: Armenia is on the “right side,” understands where the dangers originate, and therefore requires external support and resources.
At the same time, the concept of “hybrid war” is used as a universal justification mechanism. Any internal problem — from public discontent to a crisis of trust — is attributed to foreign interference. The authorities deliberately absolve themselves of responsibility for ongoing processes. Such an approach does not protect democratic institutions; on the contrary, it undermines them by preemptively framing any dissent as the result of hostile external influence.
Against this backdrop, the belated inclusion of the “Western Azerbaijan” project in the list of threats is particularly revealing. For years, official structures preferred to ignore this agenda so as not to disrupt the convenient myth of “irreversible peace.” Today, when Azerbaijan has transformed revisionist ideology into an element of state policy, sharply increased military spending, and effectively legalized corresponding rhetoric, the threat has finally been acknowledged - albeit after the fact.
Even here, the document reveals its internal inconsistency. On the one hand, it confirms the systemic nature of Azerbaijani propaganda and militarization. On the other hand, it insists that the probability of military escalation remains low. This is not an analytical error, but a deliberate contradiction designed to keep society in a state of self-reassurance. Either Baku is preparing for long-term pressure, or peace is genuinely stable. Both cannot be true simultaneously.
At the same time, the public is being prepared for yet another “breakthrough” - a partial opening of the border with Turkey. Agreements reached several years ago will be presented as historic achievements. In reality, however, such a step, taken under conditions of Yerevan’s weakened position, strengthens regional actors while narrowing the space for Armenia’s independent policy. The report highlights the benefits but remains silent on the risks: increased dependence, susceptibility to blackmail, and the loss of control over strategic communications.
The economic section of the report finally dispels the illusion that a long-term plan exists. The government effectively adopts a scenario of severing economic ties with Russia under external pressure, without proposing alternative markets or compensation mechanisms. The country is deliberately being placed into a regime of managed dependence, lacking its own economic foundation and guarantees of stability.
Ultimately, the report of the Foreign Intelligence Service does not read as an alarm signal. Rather, it is a statement confirming that Armenia has approached 2026 without alliance support, without a clear security strategy, and with growing existential risks - governed by authorities who prefer to frame their failures in the form of polished analytical reports.
The policy of Nikol Pashinyan’s government increasingly resembles a reaction to the consequences of its own decisions rather than the conduct of a governing authority. Reports of this kind only reaffirm the erosion of state thinking. The harshest conclusion drawn from the document is that Pashinyan’s government itself is becoming one of the key sources of Armenia’s security threats.
The most compelling evidence of institutional failure is the organizational structure of the Foreign Intelligence Service itself. The FIS is headed by Kristina Grigoryan — a lawyer and former ombudsperson with no background in intelligence work, strategic analysis, or operational activity. Her appointment is not accidental; it is demonstrative. For the first time in Armenia’s modern history, a core national security body is led by a person for whom intelligence is neither a profession, nor a career path, nor an area of competence, but merely an administrative post assigned on the basis of political loyalty.
The Foreign Intelligence Service, as such, was established in December 2022, after the military defeat, the loss of territories, and the evident collapse of the security architecture. Instead of restoring professional cadres and strengthening intelligence capacity, the authorities chose the path of bureaucratic imitation of reform: the foreign intelligence unit was removed from the National Security Service and registered as a separate institution. This step was not supported by any strategic concept, personnel development, or demonstrated effectiveness. It was not a reform, but an evacuation of responsibility.
As a result, Armenia obtained an artificially constructed body devoid of tradition, independent analytical culture, or real institutional agency. Headed by a figure incapable of distinguishing intelligence assessment from political narrative, the FIS could produce nothing more than a politically edited report serving the government’s course rather than the country’s national security interests.
This amounts to professional malpractice at the strategic level. Intelligence is the last line of professional sobriety within the state. When it is led by someone lacking the requisite expertise, it signals a conscious rejection of that sobriety by the authorities. For this reason, the report should be viewed not as an analytical document, but as evidence — proof that the national security system has been subordinated to Pashinyan’s political adventurism.
In this context, Armenia’s principal risk does not lie beyond its borders. It lies within the country itself - in the staff reshuffles and appointments carried out by Nikol Pashinyan’s government, which has transformed intelligence from an instrument of state protection into a decorative element of the political system.
