Elections Without a Choice: How the Architecture of Electoral Management Is Changing in Armenia
From Political Competition to Pre-Determined Outcome
Modern electoral processes in the post-Soviet space increasingly resemble managed political operations rather than classical democratic competition, with outcomes effectively determined well before election day. This is no longer simply about election fraud; it is about transforming the environment in which political choice is made. The winner is not the one who secures the majority of votes, but the one who defines the rules of the game and sets the agenda.
The precedent - conventionally described as the “Moldovan scenario” - demonstrated a fundamentally new logic of electoral management. By combining parliamentary elections with a geopolitical referendum, the authorities shifted the focus of the vote: from evaluating the government’s performance to endorsing a broader civilizational choice. Voters were made not merely to choose a politician, but to determine the country’s historical trajectory. Within such a framework, genuine political competition effectively disappears, as any dissent is framed as a threat to the nation’s future.
The Armenian Adaptation: From Mobilization to Filtration
Political developments in Armenia suggest the possible adaptation of this model, albeit in a more restrictive form. In the Moldovan case, the key instrument was diaspora mobilization. The Armenian version, however, may be built on the opposite principle - selective voter filtration. Electoral management is shifting from expanding turnout to limiting participation among groups whose political behavior could alter the balance of power.
The Armenian diaspora in the Russian Federation remains the most sensitive element in this equation. It constitutes the largest external voting group and has consistently demonstrated support for political figures associated with an alternative model of governance, most notably Samvel Karapetyan and Robert Kocharyan. Under these circumstances, the central issue is not political preference, but physical access to the voting process.
A de facto ban on voting from abroad fundamentally reshapes the electorate. Members of the Armenian diaspora - particularly those residing in the Russian Federation - are effectively deprived of the opportunity to vote in Armenia’s upcoming elections. While the right to vote formally remains intact, it can only be exercised within Armenia’s territory.
In this context, citizens’ political choices become secondary to their ability to physically travel to Armenia. Administrative barriers - bureaucratic complications with documentation, restrictions on border crossings, and the absence of organized infrastructure to facilitate large-scale voter return - serve as effective mechanisms of electoral selection. As a result, a significant portion of the diaspora is de facto excluded from the political process without formally being stripped of voting rights.
Thus, the outcome of the elections may depend less on the counting of ballots than on the prior reduction of the electorate itself.
The Phenomenon of Spoilers: The Managed Blurring of Choice
The sustained use of political “spoilers” has become an additional feature of Armenian electoral practice. In particular, small parties and political projects - with neither organizational history nor a stable public base - tend to emerge on the eve of elections and suddenly register noticeable levels of support in sociological surveys, including those conducted by Gallup.
Such structures are cultivated by the authorities and actively promoted in the media space for a limited period during the campaign. Their purpose is not to win, but to fragment the opposition vote, create the illusion of pluralism, and dilute support for the incumbent authorities’ genuine opponents.
As a result, voters are presented with an artificially long list of candidates, the majority of whom do not genuinely seek a change of power. Under such conditions, elections do not serve to correct the political course; rather, they function to legitimize a predetermined outcome.
A Fake Agenda
At the same time, an information environment is being shaped in which opposition centers are encouraged to weaken one another. Campaigns aimed at discrediting key political figures unfold simultaneously from different power centers, despite the formal confrontation between political camps. Nikol Pashinyan’s team consistently portrays Samvel Karapetyan as a conduit of foreign influence. Robert Kocharyan, in turn, is increasingly targeted by supporters of Serzh Sargsyan.
This synchronized dynamic - despite the visible antagonism between Pashinyan and Sargsyan - serves a single tactical objective: preventing the emergence of a unified and strong opposition alternative. The result is the construction of a “fake agenda” that distracts from preparations for a fundamental change in the rules of the game.
Public attention is absorbed by personal rivalries and domestic political disputes, while strategic transformations of the electoral framework remain outside meaningful public debate. Consequently, the opposition becomes entangled in battles over interpretations of the past, while the authorities may be shaping the future conditions under which voting itself will take place.
A Geopolitical Referendum as an Instrument for Neutralizing Competition
The most consequential element of this potential scenario is the combination of elections with a referendum framed in terms of national survival: peace or war, security or risk, future or revenge. Within such a structure, the incumbent authorities cease to be the subject of political evaluation and instead present themselves as guarantors of a historic choice.
In this model, the opposition inevitably finds itself cast as a force allegedly capable of destabilizing the country. The socio-economic agenda loses significance, as voters are offered an emotionally charged, civilizational choice rather than a substantive comparison of governance models.
Is the Opposition Ready for a Change in the Rules of the Game?
Opposition forces have consistently found themselves reacting to informational agendas set by the authorities. This suggests the absence of an independent strategic framework of their own.
One of the key risks for the opposition is that, in the event of a sudden shift in the parameters of the election campaign - such as the refusal to register certain candidates, a pivot toward a referendum-centered campaign, or restrictions on voting from abroad - the time available to adapt to the new conditions would be minimal.
Under conditions of reactive management, the opposition inevitably falls behind.
In this context, several fundamental questions arise. Does the opposition recognize that the struggle may not be against specific candidates, but against the very possibility of competitive elections? Is there a strategy to counter administrative barriers that restrict the return of voters? Is there a plan to mitigate the fragmentation of opposition votes through spoiler parties? Have they accounted for the potential refusal to register key opposition figures? Are opposition forces prepared for a campaign in which a geopolitical referendum suddenly becomes the central issue, effectively neutralizing traditional criticism of the authorities?
Taken together, these questions lead to a broader strategic dilemma: Is the opposition prepared to treat a potentially unfavorable electoral outcome not as a final defeat, but as a political trigger? Do they have a plan to transform the results of the vote into a sustained post-election process - mobilizing protest potential, consolidating public discontent, and initiating mechanisms for political change beyond formal electoral procedures? In other words, does the opposition possess a strategy not only for participating in elections, but for acting after them?
Conclusion
If the Armenian opposition is unable to answer how it intends to act under conditions of voter filtration, geopolitical mobilization, and the possible exclusion of its own leaders, the primary risk is not electoral defeat itself. Rather, it is participation in a political process whose outcome may be predetermined long before the campaign even begins.
At the same time, the situation changes fundamentally if opposition forces view elections not as a final objective, but as the initial stage of broader political confrontation. If their strategy is based not on winning a campaign conducted on Nikol Pashinyan’s terms, but on preparedness for post-election dynamics - street mobilization and a potential revolutionary redistribution of power - then the electoral process may cease to function as a trap and instead become the starting point of the system’s crisis. In that case, the opposition would retain a genuine chance to win.
